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REPLY
MSAS CAN BE A WINDFALL FOR THE REST OF
US, TOO
Greg Scandlen"
Regina Jefferson wrote that Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) are
"windfalls for the healthy, wealthy and wise" in a recent issue of the
Catholic University Law Review.' She only got it one-third right. The
"wise" (those who are interested in learning more about their health care
alternatives) will certainly benefit from having a MSA, but so will the
unhealthy and the "unwealthy." Indeed, MSAs have remarkable bene-
fits for people of modest means and average, or less-than-average, health
status, as this Article will explore.
The federal government, along with most state governments, currently
provides an unlimited exclusion for employer-sponsored health care in-
surance. That is, the law excludes the value of an employer-sponsored
health plan when counting an employee's taxable income. The value of a
health benefit is exempt from state and federal income taxes, payroll
taxes such as FICA (social security), and Medicare taxes. There is no
limitation on this exclusion. Whether the value of the benefit is $2000,
$4000, or $10,000, the law excludes it from taxes.
The Lewin Group estimated the federal revenue loss from the exclu-
sion would exceed $120 billion in the year 2000,2 with additional losses
for state government and other payroll-based assessments such as state
and federal unemployment taxes. This makes employer-sponsored
health care the third biggest entitlement program in the country, ex-
ceeded only by Social Security and Medicare.
Remarkably, this subsidy is available only to employer-sponsored
plans. People who purchase their own health coverage receive no such
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1. Regina T. Jefferson, Medical Savings Accounts: Windfalls for the Health, Wealthy
& Wise, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 685,689 (1999).
2. See JOHN SHELLS ET AL., HEALTH INSURANCE AND TAXES: THE IMPACT OF
PROPOSED CHANGES IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY 1 (1999) (final report prepared by
the Lewin Group, Inc. for the National Coalition on Health Care), available at
http://<www.lewin.com/library>.
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benefit. Current law allows the self-employed to take a portion of their
health insurance premiums as a deduction from their taxable income, but
they do not get the FICA exclusion. Further, workers whose employers
do not provide coverage obtain no deduction unless their medical ex-
penses exceed 7.5% of their adjusted gross income.
The effects on our health care system of this peculiar tax policy are
profound:
It is regressive. The current health care system provides a much
greater federal subsidy for people with high incomes than for people with
lower incomes. The Lewin study calculates that families with incomes
below $15,000 receive an average subsidy of $79, while families with in-
comes of $100,000 or more receive an average subsidy of $2638.
It is inefficient. The government subsidizes approximately 40% of the
cost of this coverage;3 therefore, people buy more expensive health in-
surance packages than they otherwise would, resulting in the over-
utilization of health care services.
It is inequitable. It provides no assistance to those who need it most,
the uninsured and people who buy their own health insurance: those who
currently purchase individual health insurance are older and poorer than
4are those who get employment-based coverage. Those without coverage
tend to be younger, poorer, and less educated than average
It injects the employer into the health care decision-making process.
While some large firms have professional benefit managers and a choice
of health plans, 83% of all employers do not offer a choice of plans,6
thereby forcing workers to accept whatever plan their employers choose
to offer. This allows employers, such as owners of car repair shops and
video rental stores, to choose a health insurance plan that their employ-
ees must live with.
There are currently a number of efforts underway in Congress (and
elsewhere) to correct these inequities. These efforts seek to either re-
place the exclusion with a refundable tax credit or supplement the cur-
3. See id. at 4. Sheils estimates that "total spending for employer-sponsored cover-
age will be $355.9 billion in 2000," against which the total state and federal tax expenditure
is $140.9 billion, or 39.6% of the total. See id. at 5-6.
4. See Deborah Chollet, The Individual Insurance Market: Consumers, Insurers and
Market Behavior (paper commissioned by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and
presented at The Evolution of the Individual Insurance Market: Now and in the Future,
Wash., D.C., Jan. 20, 1999).
5. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 1998 1-4 (1999),
available at <http://www.census.gov:80/prod/99pubs/p60-208pdf>.
6. See M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Trends in Managed Care & Managed
Competition, 1993-1997, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 75, 81.
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rent system with a tax credit for those who do not have access to em-
ployer-based coverage.7 Either approach would allow people who pur-
chase their own coverage to have tax benefits similar to those whose em-
ployers provide the coverage, thus giving consumers more control over
their healthcare.
These efforts are the next step in a process of health care reform that
began with the enactment of the MSA pilot program in 1996. This is all
part of a movement to empower patients to take more control over their
own health care needs and to get health care plans and providers to re-
spond to the demands of health care consumers.
I. MSA ESSENTIALS
A. Concept
The concept of the MSA is really very simple: you can reduce your
premiums by raising your deductible, then put the money saved into an
account to cover expenses below the deductible. This is not exotic. Try
it on your auto policy: if you currently have a $250 deductible, find out
how much you would save by raising it to $500. Usually the premium
savings will exceed the difference in deductible. That is, by raising your
deductible by $250, you will probably save more than $250 in annual
premium. There are several reasons this is true. The most obvious rea-
son is that the insurer no longer has to pay $250 in potential claims.
However, because relatively few people have a claim in any given year,
this is only a portion of the savings. More importantly, insurers know
from experience that people with higher deductibles are more careful in
their behavior. They take fewer risks because they have more at stake.
"Moral hazard" expresses the concept that people who are insured en-
gage in riskier behavior than those who are uninsured. People with low-
deductible auto policies will drive more carelessly than will people with
high deductibles. People who own run-down warehouses on the water-
front are more likely to see the warehouse burn down if they have fire
insurance, than if they do not. In health care, moral hazard blends in
with another concept known as "induced demand." People who have
low-deductible health insurance coverage are far more likely to consume
a wide range of services, many of questionable value. Having a higher
deductible encourages people to think twice before consuming services.
7. See generally EMPOWERING HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS THROUGH TAX
REFORM (Grace-Marie Arnett ed., Univ. of Mich. Press 1999).
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B. Administrative Costs
There is yet another reason that higher deductibles save money, and
that is the severe inefficiency of processing small claims through an in-
surance mechanism. Jefferson is critical of MSAs because she believes
they will add to administrative costs. Specifically, she says, "hospital
outpatient departments ... will find it necessary to restructure their bill-
ing procedures to bill patients individually."8 Jefferson clearly does not
understand how the health care industry processes bills today. Providers
are already able to bill individuals because individuals already pay for
many services. Thus, there is no "restructuring" involved. Further, it is
far less expensive for a provider to present a bill and be paid at the time
of service, than it is to file a claim and wait, often for weeks, to be reim-
bursed by an insurer. One of the most common complaints providers
make about insurance companies is the extreme complexity of their bill-
ing requirements, with each of many carriers demanding unique systems.
Health care reform advocates suggest that eliminating the billing pa-
perwork through a single payer system would free-up tens of billions of
dollars, possibly over $100 billion a year, to pay for direct services. 9
There is an organization of physicians based in Washington state that has
promised to charge cash-paying customers half or less of what they
charge insured customers-due solely to the reduced overhead of not
having to bill the insurers.' °
The cost and complexity of insurance billing has barely begun when
the claim leaves the provider. Whether filed in paper format or elec-
tronically, it is expensive for a carrier to adjudicate a claim.
Insurance billing involves several discrete acts. First, the carrier must
confirm that the patient is a covered insured and that the provider is a
network provider. Next, the carrier must determine whether the in-
sured's contract covers the billed service and whether the service is ap-
propriate for the diagnosis. Then, the carrier must ascertain whether the
insured has fulfilled their deductible and co-insurance responsibilities.
Thereafter, the carrier forwards the claim for "repricing" depending on
the provider's network status and agreed-upon discount. Finally, the car-
rier cuts the check and forwards it to the provider; then, it sends an Ex-
planation of Benefits (EOB) to the insured, enters the data, and sends a
8. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 717.
9. See Carol Stevens, Will Administrative Savings Really Pay for Health Reform?,
MED. ECON., Oct. 25, 1993, at 147, 148.
10. See Julie Appleby, Prescription: Cash Only, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 1999, at B1.
For more information on the SimpleCare program, see <http://www.simplecare.com>.
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summary report to the employer. Additionally, the insurance carrier will
perform periodic audits to confirm that the patient actually received the
services billed, as well as utilization review efforts to ensure appropriate
care. There are also customer and provider service departments to an-
swer questions about claims status and sometimes to explain the denial
of a claim. The process for a small claim is just as lengthy as a large
claim, and the cost of processing a small claim can often exceed the cost
of the claim itself.
With MSA programs, the patient typically pays small claims with a
MSA debit card or personal check at the time of service, saves the re-
ceipt, and then does not even bother the insurance company until the to-
tal claims exceed the $2000-$4000 deductible. Fewer than ten percent of
all patients should even have to talk to their insurers in the course of a
year, which is a major contributor to the lower cost of a high-deductible
insurance plan. Although there may indeed be some administrative costs
associated with the savings account itself, these costs are no greater than
the costs associated with any other savings or checking account and can
usually be paid out of the income generated from the account balance.
II. HEALTHY AND WEALTHY
Jefferson's main complaint about the MSA program is that it will
benefit the healthy and wealthy at the expense of the rest of us. It is a
complaint often made, probably because it is a catchy slogan well-suited
for Washington's spinmeisters, but no truer because of constant repeti-
tion.
Whether one chooses a MSA depends in part on the alternatives. It is
impossible to examine the likelihood of a selection by looking at only
one of the choices. One needs to compare the choices side-by-side.
A. Traditional Indemnity vs. MSAs
A "traditional indemnity" plan, also known as a "fee-for-service"
(FFS) or "major medical" plan, is characterized by a small deductible
(usually $250 to $500) and "co-insurance" that is paid on top of the de-
ductible (typically 20% of claims) by the insured up to some "stop-loss"
level ($1500 or so). As the name implies, a fee-for-service plan pays pro-
viders a fee for providing a service. The plan may base payment on a
fixed fee schedule or may employ a "usual and customary" fee. FFS
plans exercise little control over which providers a patient may use and
exert a minimum of "managed care" efforts, although utilization review
programs are increasingly common in FFS plans.
Another coverage option is the Preferred Provider Organizations
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
(PPOs), which are customarily considered to be part of "managed care,"
but act more like traditional FFS plans than like Health Maintenance
Organizations (HMOs). PPOs rely on deductibles and co-insurance and
pay providers on a fee-for-service basis. PPOs differ from FFS plans in
that they usually negotiate discounted rates from their "preferred" net-
work of providers. PPOs direct their patients to the preferred providers
by charging a higher co-insurance rate for going "out of the network."
The MSA is structured similarly, but with a higher deductible and a
savings account for paying expenses below the deductible. A typical
MSA program, as established by Congress in 1996,11 starts with a health
insurance policy with a deductible of $2000 for an individual or $4000 for
a family. The individual (or the employer) may deposit $1300 into her
savings account (the MSA itself), while a family may deposit $3000.
These deposits are "excluded" if made by the employer (free of income
and payroll taxes) and are "deductible" if made by the account holder
(free of income tax alone).
In the first year, there is a corridor of expenses covered neither by the
MSA nor by the insurance policy. For an individual, the corridor would
be the $700 between the $1300 MSA balance and the $2000 deductible at
which point the insurance kicks in. In the second year, that corridor may
be removed if there is money left over in the account after the first year.
Account holders may use the money in the MSA to pay for health care
expenses at any time without penalty. Alternatively, one may invest the
money in the MSA and any income in the account can build up tax-free
over time. Account holders may also withdraw money to pay for other
needs, but must pay taxes plus a 15% penalty on the amount withdrawn.
The essential idea behind the MSA is that the account holder can de-
posit the money saved on premiums into the savings account. By going
from a $250 deductible FFS plan to a $2000 deductible MSA plan, an in-
dividual might save enough to pay the maximum $1300 contribution.
Obviously, whether that happens in reality depends on local market con-
ditions, the attitude of the insurance company, and risk factors associated
with the insured. Nevertheless, the idea of saving $1300 in premiums by
raising the deductible by $1750 is not unrealistic.
12
Ultimately, as illustrated below, most people will spend less money
out-of-pocket with a MSA than they would with a FFS or PPO plan. Im-
11. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 301,110 Stat. 1936, 2037 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 220 (Supp. III 1997)).
12. For example, this author was running a small trade association in the early 1990s.
The five-person trade association switched from a $250 deductible PPO in one year to a
$1000 deductible FFS program thereby saving $973 per person in premiums.
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portantly, not only high income or healthy people will spend less. Both
high and low utilizers and high- and low-income people will spend less.
Only a small sliver of expenditures involves higher out-of-pocket costs
for the MSA program.
Because plan designs may vary, we will look at four different scenarios
to see how the finances play out. Plan A is a $250 deductible FFS plan
with a 20% co-insurance on the next $7500 of claims. Plan B is a $500
deductible with a 20% co-insurance on the next $5000 in claims. Plan C
is a MSA with a $2000 deductible and a $1000 contribution in the ac-
count, and Plan D is a MSA with a $2500 deductible and a $1500 contri-
bution to the account.
Health Care---- -- Out-of-pocket costs--------
Spending Plan A Plan B Plan C Plan D
$ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0 $ 0
250 250 250 0 0
500 300 500 0 0
750 350 550 0 0
1000 400 600 0 0
1500 500 700 500 0
2000 600 800 1000 500
2500 700 900 1000 1000
3000 800 1000 1000 1000
3500 900 1100 1000 1000
4000 1000 1200 1000 1000
5000 1200 1400 1000 1000
6000 1400 1500 1000 1000
8000 1750 1500 1000 1000
In these hypothetical scenarios, there is only a small range of expenses
for which the MSA out-of-pocket exposure is greater than the traditional
FFS program-claims between $2000 and $3500. In fact, because ac-
count holders pay the FFS expenses with after-tax dollars, but receive
tax-preferred treatment of MSA expenses, the range is even smaller, de-
pending on the marginal tax rate of the insured.
The notion that the unhealthy and the "unwealthy" do better in a tra-
ditional FFS indemnity plan than they would in a MSA is false. People
with few expenses do better under the MSA, regardless of their income,
as do people with very high expenses regardless of their income.
When we consider that a person with few expenses actually will have
money left over at the end of the year for next year's MSA, the "healthy
20001
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and wealthy" charge becomes more absurd. For example, a person with
$250 in expenses in the first year may have $750 left over at the end of
the year. This $750 is far more meaningful to someone earning
$10,000/year than to someone earning $100,000/year. It amounts to a
bonus of 7.5% of the former person's income, but less than 1% of the lat-
ter's.
Jefferson also suggests that people with MSAs are less likely to take
advantage of preventive care.13 Again, this is not true because the money
in the savings account provides a source of funds that is not available in a
traditional FFS plan to pay for exactly those kinds of services, especially
for people of modest means.
B. HMO vs. MSA
If a MSA is better for the unhealthy and "unwealthy" when compared
to a traditional FFS or PPO plan, how does it fare when compared to an
HMO? An HMO environment presents an entirely different dynamic
and set of choices than a FFS plan does. As a rule, HMO premiums cost
slightly less than the MSA/high deductible insurance plan combination,
and usually involve lower cost sharing. A lower-income person probably
would prefer the HMO, all other things being equal. As it turns out,
however, not all other things are always equal.
Low-income workers might still prefer to pay the added cost of the
MSA program because, if they are careful in their health care spending,
they will have money left over at the end of the year. As with the exam-
ple above, the opportunity to save $750 or more in a personal account
means a lot more to a lower-income worker than it does to the
"wealthy." The value of extra cash to the working poor may be much
higher than the value they place on extra doctors' visits. Taking advan-
tage of this opportunity is admittedly a matter of personal choice. Not
everyone places more value on cash than they do on doctors' visits and
many other factors influence the perceived value of one or the other.
For instance, proximity of services is a major factor. It is much easier for
a low-income family with children to make use of an HMO's services if it
has facilities or participating providers close-by. The value of the benefit
diminishes greatly and the prospect of money in the bank may look more
attractive if the closest facility is across town or in the distant suburbs.
Hence, for lower-income workers, the appeal of a MSA may be a toss-
up when compared to an HMO. Some will prefer one, while some will
13. See Jefferson, supra note 1, at 708 n.134. "Opponents, however, argue that this
price-shopping will result in a neglect of preventive care, such as annual checkups." Id.
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prefer the other. But what about the unhealthy? Would they prefer a
HMO or MSA? Again, it is hard to say. Certainly, the answer is not as
simple as Jefferson suggests.
As we have seen lately with the "managed care backlash," many peo-
ple fiercely resist the idea of having a limited choice of doctors, or of
having the health plan second-guess recommended services. The "un-
healthy" (people with chronic or acute medical conditions) are far more
sensitive to the problems of managed care than are people of average
risk who encounter the health care system only rarely. Very often, these
"high-utilizers" have their own personal network of doctors they know
and trust. If one of those doctors does not participate with an HMO or
the HMO drops the doctor from its network, that patient will be a good
candidate for a MSA. High-utilizers are also far more likely to experi-
ence the other problems associated with managed care. This includes
difficulty getting through on the phone, long waits to get an appointment,
long waits in the doctor's office, being assigned to an inappropriate spe-
cialist, and having prescribed treatments questioned. 4
Perhaps more important in evaluating the attraction of MSAs relative
to HMOs is correcting the notion that Jefferson and others seem to have
that there are two kinds of people-the healthy and the unhealthy, and
never the twain shall meet. Jefferson states, "[a]pproximately 70% of
Americans account for only 15% of national medical expenditures.
Nearly seventy-five cents of every dollar spent on health care in the
United States is attributed to only 10% of the population. 1 5 These
numbers may be approximately right-in a single given year. However,
this year's 10% of high-utilizers are not the same people as last year's
10% or next year's 10%. In fact, most acute health care expenses involve
either end-of-life care or episodic illness that may appear for a year or
two, but then are gone. One study published by the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) found "that high expenditures levels typi-
cally do not last for many years."16 This study modeled a MSA-type pro-
gram 7 based on the experience of a large Midwestern manufacturing
firm. Even without considering any behavioral response to increased
cost sharing, the study found that "about 80% of employees are left with
14. See, e.g., Robert Blendon et al., Understanding the Managed Care Backlash,
HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1998, at 80, 90.
15. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 715.
16. MATTHEW J. EICHNER ET AL., INSURANCE OR SELF-INSURANCE?: VARIATION,
PERSISTENCE AND INDIVIDUAL HEALTH ACCOUNTS 5 (National Bureau of Econ. Re-
search Working Paper No. 5640, 1996).
17. See id. (characterizing it as an "Individual Health Account").
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at least 50% of total (MSA) contributions (at retirement), but about 5%
have less than 20%. " 18 If one accounted for behavioral responses, the re-
sults would be "perhaps substantially more equal than [the study's] re-
suits suggest. ' ' 9
C. Behavioral Change
Of course, failing to consider behavioral changes is a substantial limita-
tion in the NBER study. Jefferson addresses this issue in a section enti-
tled "Questionable Underlying Theory."20 She asserts that "[tihe basic
theory underlying the MSA program is that American health care con-
sumers will consume as much health care as available, unless financial
disincentives are created. This theory may be true for most goods and
services; however, health care is fundamentally different from other con-
sumption items."'2' The balance of her argument is unpersuasive and un-
substantiated. She argues there is no "personal benefit" from consuming
excess health care services, unlike the excessive consumption of food,
which is a "personal choice., 2  Beside the philosophical reply that too
much of any good thing is not good for you, there is empirical evidence
aplenty to contradict her. A good starting point is the Rand Health In-
surance Experiment,23 and additional evidence arises out of current ef-
forts to manage patient care because "unmanaged" care results in exces-
sive costs.
The Rand study randomly assigned several thousand families into dif-
ferent plans with different cost-sharing provisions over an eight-year pe-
riod. One plan had free care, another had 25% co-insurance, another had
50% co-insurance, and another 95% co-insurance. In each of the cost-
sharing plans, the total out-of-pocket expense was capped at $1000 (this
was conducted in the late 1970s, so the $1000 deductible adjusted for to-
day's prices would be closer to $2500). The results were profound, if un-
surprising. Project Director and Harvard Professor Joseph Newhouse
writes, "[u]se of medical services responds unequivocally to changes in
the amount paid out of pocket .... Per capita expenses on the free plan
[] are 45 percent higher than those on the plan with a 95 percent co-
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 718.
21. Id. (citations omitted).
22. Id.
23. See generally JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL?: LESSONS FROM
THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (Harvard Univ. Press 1993).
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insurance rate .... He adds, "[t]he more families had to pay out of
pocket, the fewer medical services they used., 25 Importantly, the lower
use of services did not have a negative effect on health outcomes.
Managed care, too, is a response to the willingness of people to con-
sume excessive health care services when they are available. Unlike the
Rand Experiment and MSAs, managed care controls the use of services
from the supply side. That is, patients cannot get care because it is not
available, not because they have chosen to avoid it. Managed care sets
up obstacles to acquiring the care the patient demands by the use of
"gatekeepers," utilization controls, benefit limitations, provider limita-
tions, and provider incentives to under-treat. It is a small wonder that
patients are unhappy. The whole purpose of a managed care organiza-
tion is to keep patients from the care they desire.
MSAs work on precisely the opposite side of the equation. Rather
than withholding the supply of desired health care services, MSAs try to
affect the demand for services. MSAs encourage people to think twice
about the care they want because of the high price for wasteful consump-
tion. The patient, in consultation with her family and physician, makes
the value judgments about whether a particular service is worth the cost.
These value judgments and decisions are not imposed from the outside,
but are developed from within, in keeping with the values and priorities
of the individual.
Jefferson does raise an important issue concerning the influence of oc-
casional very high utilizers. The issue is that large portions of annual
health care expenses exceed the deductible of a MSA/high-deductible
plan, and thus are not subject to whatever cost-constraining effects the
MSA might provide. She says, "a more effective way of decreasing
medical care costs is to encourage the 10% of the population that spends
the most to cut back on unnecessary or wasteful services."26 Controlling
those high-cost situations is certainly important, but it does not violate
the MSA concept at all. The MSA program exists to control low-cost
routine expenses, something managed care does not do very well. Once
a patient has exceeded the deductible, she is then in the insurance por-
tion of the package and whatever cost-controlling mechanisms apply to
other insurance plans can be applied to the MSA-compatible insurance
coverage.
Today, most MSA programs include a PPO for the high-deductible
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 338.
26. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 715.
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portion of the coverage. Lawmakers never intended MSAs to be the sole
answer to all of our health care problems. Instead, Congress intended
MSAs to help patients take more control over the routine health care en-
counters that are the bulk of our transactions, if not the bulk of the costs.
III. RETIREMENT POLICY
Perhaps the oddest section of Jefferson's article is an extended detour
into the world of retirement programs. This is presumably spawned by
the fact that someone once referred to a MSA as a "medical IRA. 2 7 She
says that the "term suggests MSAs have a single, or at least a primary,
medical savings purpose. This conclusion is incorrect."2 Why is it incor-
rect? Because, as Al Crenshaw once wrote in the Washington Post, peo-
ple who avoid making withdrawals from their MSAs could wind up with
a "healthy nest egg."' 9 This whole discussion is unnecessary for several
reasons:
1. Congress certainly modeled the savings account concept after In-
dividual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). MSAs have a penalty on non-
medical withdrawals, similar to IRAs' penalties for early withdrawals.
Nevertheless, the mere fact that lawmakers modeled the tax structure af-
ter an IRA does not make a MSA a retirement program (any more than
the current discussion of "Education Savings Accounts" turns them into
health care plans).
2. It is true that once a person reaches Medicare eligibility, he or she
may withdraw MSA balances without paying additional penalties on top
of the taxes. Congress, however, did not tie this provision to retirement,
but to Medicare eligibility.0
3. The same penalty-free withdrawal applies to death or disability at
any age,3' but Jefferson does not suggest that a MSA is really a life insur-
ance policy in disguise.
4. The legislation makes it clear that Congress was hoping MSA bal-
ances would be used for several specific health care purposes that are
addressed in the law and not subject to either tax or penalty:
Retaining coverage during times of unemployment such as
through the COBRA continuation laws,32 or while receiving
27. Id. at 696.
28. Id.
29. Albert B. Crenshaw, Health Care's Hot Seller. Medical Savings Accounts, WASH.
POST, May 18,1997, at HI.
30. See 26 U.S.C. § 220(f)(4)(C) (Supp. III 1997).
31. See id. § 220(f)(4)(B).
32. See id. § 220(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
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unemployment compensation.33
" Paying for long-term care insurance premiums34 or directly
for long-term care services.
" Paying for health care expenses not covered by an insurance
plan, but eligible as § 213(d) health care expenses."
5. Jefferson is very concerned that "MSA's distribution rules sub-
stantially deviate from traditional pension policy ... [and] could affect [a
retiree's] income security., 36 Maybe so, but using those funds for that
person's health care needs prior to age sixty-five is exactly the purpose of
those funds. If an account holder ends up with some left over funds upon
retirement, that is more than they could have had under a traditional in-
surance plan.
6. Further, the notion that there is some unified national policy to-
wards retirement income is false. Retirees may receive income from
many different sources, including Social Security payments, defined con-
tribution programs like 401(k)s, defined benefit pension programs, IRAs,
SEPs, Roth IRAs, annuities, reverse annuity mortgages, traditional sav-
ings, equity investments, investments such as bonds, and possibly part-
time employment. Each activity has its own set of rules. To the extent
MSAs may add to the mix under another set of rules, so be it.
7. Jefferson notes that MSAs may be "appealing especially to indi-
viduals with limited financial resources who may be reluctant to save in
traditional IRAs or employer sponsored retirement plans for fear of los-
ing access to their funds."37 Then she turns around and worries that the
MSA will be funded at the expense of traditional programs. But if the
MSA is "appealing" to people who would not participate in the "tradi-
tional" program, then it is not cutting into the traditional program's
funds, but supplementing them with money that would not have existed
otherwise.
8. In one very strange twist of logic, Jefferson notes that people who
currently exceed the allowable $2000 IRA contribution may also open a
MSA (assuming they have a qualifying health insurance plan) and save
another sum (possibly another $2000) in the MSA. She analogizes that
possibility as a doubling of the IRA limit, but then she treats that analogy
as fact. She states that "It]he only beneficiaries of the increased IRA
33. See id. § 220(d)(2)(B)(ii)(III).
34. See id. § 220(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
35. See id. § 220(d)(2)(A).
36. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 697.
37. Id. at 698.
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contribution limit are individuals who already contribute the maximum
amount to their IRAs. Consequently, the MSA program increases the
disparity between the tax subsidy received by individuals who currently
can afford to save and those who cannot."'38 If it were true that only
those people who had contributed the maximum to an IRA were allowed
to open a MSA, then she would be right to protest. But it is not true.
MSAs do not tack on to the back end of an IRA. In fact, they run side-
by-side, and many people who cannot afford to contribute to an IRA
may find that they can contribute to a MSA. Why? Because they are
using a source of funds other than current income for the MSA contribu-
tion. The source of funds for the MSA is the premium savings that come
with changing from a low-deductible health plan to a higher-deductible
plan. The money that goes into the MSA is money that would otherwise
have gone into insurance premiums!
9. Finally, Jefferson frets too much about the relationship of MSAs
to ERISA. The health plan portion of the MSA (the high-deductible in-
surance policy) is every bit as subject to ERISA as any other employer-
sponsored health plan. The savings account portion is not subject to
ERISA because the worker owns it, not the employer. The employer
may not control the account or require the worker to use any particular
account vendor. Employees are free to change account administrators at
any time without the permission, or even the knowledge, of the em-
ployer. Jefferson misplaces her concern in any event. Congress created
ERISA, and Congress is free to amend it, repeal it, go around it, substi-
tute for it, or carve out exemptions to ERISA. If Congress wanted MSA
accounts to be subject to ERISA, it would have said so.
IV. OTHER ERRORS BY JEFFERSON
Jefferson makes a number of other errors in logic and research as well:
1. She has a one paragraph comparison of MSAs and FSAs (Flexible
Spending Accounts). Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code allows
for FSAs. They enable workers to set aside tax-free money to spend on
health care expenses not otherwise covered by their insurance, or to pay
for health insurance premiums. FSAs are similar to MSAs with one ex-
ception; that is, money not spent by the end of the calendar year is for-
feited with a FSA but may be rolled over into the next year with a MSA.
The FSA provides exactly the wrong incentive because it forces workers
to spend needlessly at the end of the year to avoid forfeiting their own
money. The MSA encourages workers to be thrifty in their health care
38. Id. at 705-06.
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spending because they may retain unspent funds. Yet, Jefferson seems
to approve of the FSA and disapprove of the MSA, without explaining
why.
2. Jefferson argues that "the cost of high-deductible plans vary and,
in many instances, are more expensive than proponents suggest."39 This
means, she says, that employers will not have enough savings to put into
the MSA, and employees would have increased out-of-pocket expenses.
That could very well happen because there is no guarantee that insur-
ance companies will lower their premiums for the high-deductible plan.
The solution, however, is simple: if the savings are not sufficient, do not
buy the MSA. Stick with the plan you currently have.
3. Jefferson assumes there is one big insurance pool, and if healthy
people leave it, costs will go up for everyone else."° She says "[the
healthiest individuals will remove themselves from the larger insurance
pool for traditional insurance arrangements, leaving only older and
sicker individuals to be covered by these insurance arrangements. 4 ' This
statement raises several issues:
We have already answered the basic premise-that MSAs will attract
only the healthy and the wealthy. All of Jefferson's other thoughts seem
to rest on that mistaken assumption.
What does Jefferson mean by "traditional insurance arrangements"?
That expression usually refers to "traditional indemnity" programs
(those other than managed care). Is she suggesting, then, that Congress
outlaw managed care along with MSAs? Or does she think managed
care has become "traditional"?
The notion that there is a single insurance pool could not be further
from the truth. There are tens of thousands of insurance pools in the
country, and none of them subsidizes the others. Every self-funded em-
ployer group is its own pool, independent from all others. Every insur-
ance company and every HMO is independent from every other insur-
ance company, and they do not subsidize each other. Even within a
single insurance company, there exist separate and independent insur-
ance pools for different states and different blocks of businesses. For ex-
39. Id. at 707.
40. See Daniel Zabinski et al., Medical Savings Accounts: Microsimulation Results
From a Model with Adverse Selection, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 195, 196 (1999). A more re-
cent study conducted by researchers at the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
noted that earlier MSA studies treated "the employment-related health insurance market
as a single entity (pool) .... In practice, however, the insurance market may not function
as a single pool, and the insurance choices in one pool need not affect the premiums in an-
other pool." Id.
41. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 708.
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ample, the Insurance Commissioner in Iowa will not allow a company to
raise its rates in Iowa to cover losses in California. Similarly, a com-
pany's small group block of business is subject to entirely different rules
and rating procedures than its block of individual, non-group business is.
Jefferson's article includes a section entitled: "MSAs Disproportion-
ately Benefit the Most Informed. 4 2 Indeed they do, but it is hard to see
why being well informed is something that should be discouraged. As in
every other area of our lives, the people with enough foresight and intel-
ligence to become well informed will do better than those without.
MSAs encourage people to take more control over their health care
needs and to gather the information they need to do so. Knowledge is
not static. It is available to anyone motivated to find it. This has never
been truer than today with the widespread use of the Internet. But
knowledge without power is meaningless. MSAs provide consumers with
the power to affect their own health care and the opportunity to get the
information to do so well.
Finally, Jefferson notes that the current MSA design is complex and
"could have a negative impact on its success."43 Sadly, she is right. The
design enacted by Congress is absurdly complicated and nearly impossi-
ble to explain to a potential buyer. Some commentators have argued
that Congress, particularly Senator Kennedy (D-Mass.) and his allies
who oppose the whole idea of patient empowerment, designed the pro-
gram to fail. Also, the federal law confines MSAs to the self-employed
and groups with fifty or fewer employees, which is not exactly the most
innovative sector of the health care market. Moreover, the enrollment
limits have kept out many of the larger players in health care financing-
750,000 potential enrollees are not enough to get their attention.
Still, some 60,000 MSA accounts have been opened through 1999,
nearly a third by people who were previously uninsured. 4 Enrollment is
steadily growing at a rate of 55% per year. So, like other new product
offerings, a small group of innovators has picked up MSAs, and the
larger population is slowly warming to the idea. This evolution should
not be surprising. It took some twenty years for HMOs and 401(k) plans
to get off the ground, and MSAs will probably take as long.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 719.
44. See I.R.S. Announcement 99-95 (Oct. 1, 1999), available at
<http://ftp.fedworld.gov/pub/irs-drop/a-99-95-pdf>.
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V. CONCLUSION
No one has argued that MSAs are the best approach for all people at
all times. Two separate studies, a marketing research study by the Blue
Cross Blue Shield Association45 and a public opinion survey by the Kai-
ser-Harvard Foundation" on the Public and Health, each found that 43%
of workers would choose a MSA if one were offered. That means 57%
would not. The important thing is that people have a choice.
HMOs are a good choice for many, MSAs are a good choice for many
others, and other forms of health care financing (PPOs, traditional in-
demnity, the newer "Provider Service Organizations," and whatever else
may come along) will all have their customers. Some of the companies
offering these products will do a good job and will prosper. Others will
do a poor job and will fail. That is how the American economy grows
and evolves in every sector except health care. It is time to subject health
care to the same discipline.
45. See generally Strategic Consulting Service of the Blue Cross Blue Shield Associa-
tion, Medical Savings Accounts, presented at the 1995 National Finance and Actuarial
Mini-Conference (Dec. 11, 1995) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review).
46. See The Health Benefits Group, Public Opinion: Study Finds 43% Would Choose
an MSA, PATIENT POWER REP., Aug. 21, 1996, at 2 (summarizing the findings of the Kai-
ser-Harvard Foundation study).
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